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Towarak the Zero Accident Goal 
TOWARDS THE ZERO ACCIDENT WAL: ASSISTING THE FIRST OFFICER 
MONITOR AND CRALLENGE CAPTAIN ERRORS 
Eugen Tarnow 
In this article the authority system in the airplane cockpit is related to thirty year old authority studies of Stanley 
Milgram. Human errors made in the cockpit are found similar to those made in the authority experiments. It is argued 
that up to 20% of all airplane accidents may be preventable by optimizing the monitoring and challenging of captain 
errors by the first officer. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a hierarchical organization, the boss's authority in 
the work function can be more or less absolute. In 1963, the 
eminent social psychologist Stanley Milgram measured the 
strength of the United States society authority. He found 
that it was about much stronger than expected - a 
psychology experimenter was able to make subjects tiny 
out orders that led to the simulated injury and death of a 
confederate. Such strong authority tends to create situations 
in which errors made by authorities will not be corrected. 
In particular, this is the case in the airplane cockpit: a 
disproportionate number ofaccidents occur with the captain 
flying erroneously and the first officer failing to monitor 
and challenge the captain errors. 
We make the case that any lack of monitoring and 
challenging of the captain by the first officer is due to the 
already well documented difficulty of monitoring and 
challenging authority in our society. The Milgram 
experiments are described briefly, specific connections 
between the experiment and the authority structure in the 
airplane cockpits are made and using this fiame work an 
accident is analyzed more closely using a cockpit voice 
recording. We make a numerical estimate of how often 
inadequate monitoring and challenging errors results in 
, accidents. Finally, we suggest ways to achieve the proper 
amount of monitoring and challenging by use of a simple 
"monitoring and challenging optimization" technique 
during LOFT. 
THE SOURCES OF THE CAPTAIN'S 
AUTHORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COCKPIT 
In a typical commercial airplane codcpit there is a 
captain, a first officer and sometimes a flight engineer. In 
this chapter we will limit ourselves to considering the 
relationship between the captain and the first officer. We 
begin by describing the many sources of the captain's 
authority. They include rules, difkrent levels of flight 
experience, aviation tradition, military, corporate, and 
societal norms and values. 
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) states that a 
captain, nobody else, is the final authority on the airplane. 
The CFR sets differential requirements for captains and 
fkst officers. For a captain it requires about 1500 h m s  of 
flight time and for a first officer the requirement is only 
200 hours of flight time. Once a first officer llfills the 
CFR requirement to become a captain, he or she must also 
11fi11 the captain requirements of the particular airline. 
Personnel policies provide additional thresholds for both 
overall flight hours and flight hours in the particular 
aircraft and the pilot also needs to have seniority on the 
airline's union list. It typically takes a decade or two to 
become a captain on a large airplane. In the NTSB's 
accident sample (see below), captains had 3-4 times more 
experience than their first officers whether measwed by the 
historical total flying time (median times of 14,000 vs. 
5,100 hours) or the experience in the accident aircraft type 
(median times of 3300 vs. 880 hours). 
Aviation organizational norms include the individualistic 
thinking ftom the historical period of the single-pilot 
planes. This tradition devalues the first officer. Thus, the 
institution of the first officer is "not hlly developed," and 
the latter plays a "distinctly secondary role". Indeed, "in 
1952 the guidelines for proficiency checks at one major 
airline categorically stated that the first officer should not 
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correct errors made by the captain" (Helmreich & Foushee, 
1993, pp. 4-5). 
Military values enter commercial airlines when pilots 
who are military veterans enter the civilian workforce. 
These values include "respect for rank, for leaders who take 
charge and act decisively, and for subordinates who 
understand that it is usually not appropriate to question the 
decisions of their superiors" (Birnbach & Longridge, 1993, 
p. 265). 
Additionally, the values of a hierarchical corporate 
culture contribute to strong authohty relationships. For 
example, in a New York Times article, the strength of the 
authority of the CEO of a particular airline was indicated 
by the CEO's staying power in conjunction with seemingly 
extreme incompetence. He would "doze o f '  in meetings 
and call the company officers, and even the airline, by the 
wrong name (Bryant, 1994, p. 17N). 
The Captain's authority can be even stronger in other 
societies. Merritt and Helmreich (1996) found that the 
statement, 'Senior staff deserves extra benefits and 
privileges," elicited a neutral position to slight 
disagreement among American captains and first officers 
fiom four airlines, but those of a Brazilian airline agreed 
with it. The statement, "Crewmembers should not question 
the decisions or actions of the captain except when they 
threaten the safety ofthe flight," elicited variations between 
15 and 93% agreement among pilots in different countries, 
and the statement, "If I perceive a problem with the flight, 
I will speak up, regardless of who might be affected," 
elicited variations between 36 and 98 % agreement. Finally, 
the statement, "The organization's rules should not be 
broken - even when the employee thinks it is in the 
company's best interests," elicited variations between 22 
and 76 %. That these statements wry over to actual 
differences in behavior seems reasonable. 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY FINDINGS: THE 
DIFFICULTY OF CHALLENGING STRONG 
AUTHORITY 
Excessively obedient behavior in the presence of authority 
was found in the psychology laboratory by Stanley Milgram 
over thirty-five years ago (Milgram, 1974). In these 
experiments, a subject, the teacher, is asked by the 
experimenter to give electrical shocks to a confederate, the 
learner. The stated purpose of the experiment is to 
understand how punishment affects memory recall. The 
learner first fakes discomfort and as the fske electrical 
shocks increase to dangerous levels, he suddenly becomes 
quiet. There are four of Milgram's findings that can help 
shed light on inadequate monitoring and challenging in the 
airplane cockpit: 
1. Excessive Obedience: Milgram found that most 
people can be made to inflict intense pain and even kill the 
learner. 
2. Hesitant Challengjng: The teacher's objections 
to giving the learner electrical shocks were o%en hesitant 
and easily overruled by the experimenter's replies, such as 
telling the teacher that "the experiment requires that you 
continue." 
* 
3. Lack of Monitoring: The teacher accepts the 
authority's definition of the situation, which does not 
include the choice of disobedience but only the necessity of I 
continued obedience. Indeed, in the Milgram experiment 
not one out of almost a thousand teacher-subjects came up 
with an interpretation leading them to call the police or fiee 
the learner (Zimbardo, 1974). 
4. Physical Closeness Matters: The strength of the 
authority of the experimenter was found to be higher the 
closer the teacher was to the experimenter. ~ 
In addition, there is the Milgram Prediction Error: It was 
shown that predictions (done by psychiatrists, graduate 
students and faculty in the behavioral sciences, college 
sophomores, and middleclass adults) underestimate the 
rate of obedience to authority by a fador of a hundred 
(Milgram, 1974)! This Milgram Prediction Error, which 
remains the same, keeps organizations fiom addressing the 
issue of how to protect against erroneous authority. 
THE DIFFICULTY OF CHALLENGING AN 
ERRONEOUS CAPTAIN 
There are similarities between the Milgram experimental 
situation and the behavior in the cockpit during distress. 
We make a simple correspondence between the Milgram 
experiment and the cockpit dynamics: the role of the 
experimenter is taken by the erroneous captain, the teacher 
is the first officer, and the harm to the learner and , 
everybody else is the airplane crashing. 
Observers of behavior in the aviation field have noted the 
tendency of the captain-first officer relationship to be too 
authoritarian in many instances. Ginnett (1993) writes 
about the tendency of the first officer not to question the 
captain (here, and later in other examples, I have inserted - 
the applicable findings of Milgram, mentioned above, in 
square brackets): 
The authority dynamic surrounding the 
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role of the captain must be extremely 
powerful. . . . [and] has resulted in 
crewmembers not speaking up when 
necessary [Hesitant Challengind. . . . 
This inclination may also result in 
excessive psychological dependence on 
the captain as leader to the extent that 
individual contributions to problem- 
solving are neither voiced not attempted 
[Lack of Monitoring]. For example, one 
captain with whom I flew made a 
particularly poor approach . . . setting off 
numerous alarms. In reviewing crew 
members1 inactions afterward, the young 
second officer (who literally said nothing 
during the final approach) admitted that 
he had never seen an approach quite like 
that, but figured "the captain must know 
what he's doing" [Lack of Monitorin4 
(Ginnett, 1993, pp. 88-89). 
A first officer also comments on how difficult it was for 
him to convince the captain that an error was being 
made: 
I was the first officer on an airline flight 
into Chicago O'Hare. The captain was 
flying .. . . On our approach, Approach 
Control told us to slow to 180 knots. I 
acknowledged and waited for the captain 
to slow down. He did nothing, so I 
figured he didn't hear the clearance. So I 
repeated, "Approach said slow to 180," 
and his reply was something to the effect 
of, "I'll do what I want." I told him at 
least twice more and received the same 
kind of answer mesitant Challennind 
. . . . [Approach Control] then asked us to 
turn east. I told them we would rather 
not because of the weather and we were 
given present heading and to maintain 
3000 ft. The captain descended to 3000 
ft. and kept going to 2500 ft. even 
though I told him our altitude was 3000 
ft. His comment was, "You just look out 
the damn window." (from a confidential 
report submitted to the NASAIFAA 
Aviation Safety Reporting System; 
quoted in Ginnett, 1993, p. 74). 
Two researchers write similarly about the difficulty of the 
firs! officer to get the attentim of the captain that an error 
was being made, rekrring to "a co-pilot, concerned that 
take-off thrust was not properly set during a departure in a 
snow storm, failing to get the attention of the captain 
[Hesitant Challenging] with the aircraft stalling and 
crashing into the Potomac River" (I-IeImreich and Foushee, 
1993, p. 6). 
Wiener et al(1993) have classified typical crew errors. If 
we investigate this classification we find that several are 
related to elements of the Milgram experiment. Three of 
these errors may be related to, Lack of Monitoring: '%lure 
to set priorities", "inadequate monitoring", and "iilure to 
utilize available data" A fourth error is related to Hesitant 
Challenging: "failure to communicate intent and plans." 
(Wiener et al, 1993, p xvii). 
A Case Studv With a Cockvit Voice Recording 
On December 1, 1993, Express I1 Airlines Inc. 1 
Northwest Airlink Flight 5719 descended too quickly and 
crashed before it hit the runway in Hibbing, Minnesota. All 
sixteen people on board died. According to the NTSB 
(NTSB, 1994a) the crash was caused by several Wors: the 
captain flew the airplane inappropriately; did not "exercise 
proper crew coordination"; the first officer did not properly 
monitor [Lack of Monitoring] and alert the captain of the 
problematic descent [Hesitant Challenging]; the captain 
intimidated his first officer; there was inadequate airlime 
oversight of the captain, who had a history of intimidating 
his first officers; and there was inadequate FAA 
surveillance of the airline. 
That the captain's authority was strong in the cockpit can 
be deduced as follows. The captain intimidated five out of 
six first officers interviewed. He had actually h c k  one of 
them for mistakenly leaving the intercom on, and this fact 
had been passed on to the first officer ofthe accident flight. 
His first officers never reported the i c t  that the captain did 
not fly by the book, violated company policies on sexual 
harassment, sleeping in flight, and flying with mechanical 
irregularities. 
The first officer, on the other hand, was a new 
probationary employee who '%ad just spent $8,500 of his 
own money to be trained for a job that provided an annual 
earning potential of $18,000." Such high stakes make it 
less likely that such a first officer would challenge a captain 
who could have a detrimental elTed on his career. 
The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcript showed 
that ''most of the captain's communication with the first 
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officer was either to correct him or to tell him what to do." 
Other captains testified afterwards that the first officer had 
not needed these directions during their flights. Some of 
these instructions were even absurd. Further, according to 
the NTSB, "the statements of the first officer on the CVR 
suggest a tense and almost reserved attitude toward the 
captain ~xcessiveObedience]. Information provided bythe 
first officer to the captain was couched in a questioning 
manner rather than as an assertion." [Hesitant 
Challenging]. 
Finally, the airline only provided a kingle approach chart, 
which both captain and first officer had to use. This vital 
piece of information could only be shared by making the 
interpersonal distance minimal, thus M e r  increasing the 
captain's authority [Physical Closeness Matters]. 
Here are some excerpts fiom the CVR transcript provided 
in the NTSB report. We begin as the captain and the first 
officer discuss where they are going to stay that night, a 
passage that seems to imply a rather large power difference 
between them: 
First Officer: it's not the Radisson or anything? 
Captain: yeah right. 
First Officer: no are you serious with this 
thing .. travel? 
Captain: no I'm kidding it's the Holiday 
Inn. 
First Officer: they have a Holiday Inn in .. in ah 
1' Falls? so then I assume they have a bus? 
Captain: they have a van. 
First Officer: and they ah don't care if 
it's a four o'clock ah - 
Captain: nope because they're also 
taking our people to the airport 
besides us. 
First Officer: ah (that's right). do we 
get our own room? 
Captain: no you're going to have to 
room with me and it's only a single bed 
so there's a little carpet at the base of 
my bed and you can curl up at the base 
of my bed .. course you get your own 
room . . . you're under contract now . . . 
this is ALPA [Air Line Pilots 
Association] contract. 
The captain then asks about the time: 
Captain: what time were we out of the gate. 
First Officer: fifty-two 
Captain: okay. according to your watch or 
according to the clock? 
First Officer: ah well it's the same. 
Captain: oh okay. 
First Officer: I think I'm showing the same .. yeah. 
The time issue suggests that the First offi& is somewhat 
deferentially checking whether his watch and the airplane 
clock show the same time. 
The first officer keeps asking the captain questions as if 
the captain is his teacher: How long does it take to go 
between different locations, are there jetstream routes, 
where they are at the moment, what the control tower said, 
what approach they can take to the airport? 
First Officer: okay .. what's the ah see that falling 
star? 
Captain: either that or a falling Cessna. 
The first officer's questions keep coming. He fails to 
make standard call-outs for lowered altitudes, and , 
according to the NTSB, fails to call out the need to execute 
a missed approach. The captain did not fly the approach 
according to the stated plan, but remains at a high altitude 
too long, suggesting that the landing is going to be very 
steep. The first officer makes one attempt to challenge it: 
First Officer: just .. you just gonna stay up here as 
long as you can? 
Captain:yes. guard the hor- I mean an speeds one 
. 
hundred. 
When the captain asks the first officer whether Hibbing's ' 
control tower gave him the weather, the first officer affivms 
it after a pause even though this did not happen. 
According to the NTSB, at the time of the approach, the 
captain should have made clear to the first officer what 
were his duties. The consequence of his failure is indicated 
by a variety oforders given during the approach, distracting 
both pilots. At the point the plane is scraping the trees, the 
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following dialogue occurs: 
Captain: did you ah click the ah airport lights .. 
make sure the co-common traffic advisory 
frequency is set. [sound of seven microphone 
clicks]. click it seven times? 
First Officer: yup yeah I got it now. 
[momentary sound of scrape lasting for .1 secs] 
The plane crashes. , 
DOING THE NUMBERS: MONITORING AND 
CHALLENGING ERRORS 
In 1994 the NTSB (1994b) reviewed all serious airplane 
accidents between 1978 and 1990 subject to the conditions 
that (1) a voice recorder had to be required on the plane, 
that (2) the NTSB had conducted a major investigation 
(limiting the nukber of accidents to 75), and that (3) the 
flight crew's actions were a causal or contributing fictor 
(limiting the number of accidents further to 37). Twenty- 
three of the 37 accidents resulted in fatalities. 
The NTSB found that after procedural errors, errors of 
the type "monitoringlchallenging~' were the most common, 
occurring in 80 % of the accident sample. These were 
errors in which the non-flying crew-member (the first 
officer in 81-87% of the cases) did not properly monitor 
and challenge the flying crew-member when errors were 
committed. Usually the errors that should have been 
monitored or challenged were listed as causal or 
contributing to the accident. 
Using this data we can calculate how many accidents are 
related to inadequate monitoring and challenging. 
According to the NTSB in 19 of the 37 accidents a 
monitoringlchallenging error followed a causal error. Since 
the initial pool consisted of 75 accidents, approximately 
25% of all accidents could have been prevented by better 
monitoring and challenging. Keeping in mind that in 8 1 - 
87% of all the accidents the captain was the flying pilot, 
about 20% of all accidents could have been prevented if the 
first officer had better monitored and challenged the 
captain. 
OPTIMIZATION MONITORING AND 
CHALLENGING 
The NTSB's discussion of human errors included the 
need for practicing monitoring/challenging behavior in 
LOFT scenarios and emphasizing monitoring and 
challenging (M&C) errors in the LOFT debriefing. In 
particular, the NTSB felt that an important avenue wouid 
be the "intentional introduction of a procedural or 
decisional error by the flying pilot in the LOFT scenario. 
This technique would make certain that thenon-flying pilot 
is confionted with the opportunity to detect and challenge 
the error made by the flying pilot." This leads us, next, to 
propose M&C optimization as a technique. 
It is evident for the sake of error correction, that the 
degree of M&C is a parameter that should be modified to 
some best value between 0 and 100%. The intelligence and 
experience of the first officer should be utilized (high 
M&C), while at the same time a structure of hierarchical 
accountability needs to be present (low M&C). This is 
similar to Edward's conjecture that the trans-cockpit 
authority gradient should not be too high, nor too low, but 
optimized (Edwards, 1975). 
We begin by quantifying the M&C level by introducing 
intentional errors on the captain's part. These errors vary 
on a scale fiom small to large. Some of the decisions, 
whether erroneous or not, will be challenged by the first 
pilot and others will not. Each correct challenge will 
subtract a number fiom the overall M&C score of the 
captain-first officer relationship, while incorrect challenges 
and each error not challenged will add a number to the 
overall M&C score. 
The intentional errors can be introduced at any time 
during LOFT. For illustrative purposes, let's introduce 
errors on the checklist in Appendix I. The captain's 
instructions include the point value of a first officer 
challenge. The point value is negative if an appropriate 
instruction is challenged or if an intentional error goes 
unchallenged and positive if an intentional e m s  is 
challenged. At the end of the checklist procedure, the total 
score is added up and reported to the LOFT control tower. 
The M&C score can now be used in three ways: First, 
the score can be discussed by the trainer. If the score was 
too high, the first officer can be asked to practice and 
challenge the captain a m d i n g  to a script, while the 
captain can be asked to respond to those challenges in 
amenable ways. If the score was too low, the first officer 
has to be told that the captain is in charge of the plane and 
cannot be challenged that much and the captain should be 
taught how to deal more effectively with challenges to his 
authority. 
Second, a database can be made of the M&C score and 
the corresponding error rate (itentional or not) during the 
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rest of the simulation. The expected result would be a 
strong correlation of the M&C rate with the unchallenged 
captain error rate. Ifthis is proved to be the case, the M&C 
rate can be used as a predictor of the error rate and a 
checklist such as the on in Appendix I could be used, if the 
economics permit, during an actual take-off to prevent 
crews in which the captain can make unchallenged errors 
fiom taking OE 
Third, the regular use of M&C optimization will serve to 
create a norm for what orders can be given, and to 
encourage critical evaluations of h t k e  orders throughout 
the flying organization. 
If one accepts the figure of 20% of all airplane accidents 
as being due to inadequate M&C of the captain by the first 
officer, optimizing the authority level of the captain couid 
lower the total number of serious airplane accidents by as 
much as 20%. 
. CONCLUSION 
The captain-first officer relationship in the airplane 
cockpit was related to the obedience studies of Milgram. It 
was shown that many ofthe &om leading to human errors 
in the cockpit are similar to ones that were present in the 
Milgram obedience experiments including the lack of 
monitoring and hesitant challenging. In addition, the 
organizational context, values fiom the corporate and 
military cultures, and regulations may have created a 
captain role with too much power. 
It was emphasized that the amount of the M&C has an 
optimal value and that this value should be sought after. 
M&C optimization is an application of the Milgram 
experiment that measures the crew's M&C level in LOFT 
on a scale fiom too low to too high. Feedback into the 
social system includes crew debriefing. Organizational 
M b a c k  includes M&C levels as predictors of expected 
error rates, and the setting up of an organizational norm for 
M&C optimization. It was argued that M&C optimization 
may prevent perhaps up to 20 percent of all aircraft 
accidents. . 
Studies of authority dynamics are notorious for their 
evoking organizational defenses (Milgram's experiments, 
for examples, provoked the American Psychological 
Association to forbid the experiments fiom being ever 
carried out again). In cockpits, however, due to the high 
costs of mistakes, the organizational defenses are lowered. 
Helmreich & Foushee, 1993, write in the context of 
teaching crew decisions: 
... one is struck by the willingness of very 
disparate organizations to embrace a training 
concept that counters many of the traditions of an 
industry. 
Finally, we may note that there are many other potential 
areas of society in which M&C optimization could be used, 
especially in social systems that handle large risks such as 
financial trading floors. 
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APPENDIX 
The following checklist is derived from Normal Procedures, Aircraft Operating Manual - DC-9 revision 10 (914195). 
4 Additions made by this author are indicated in italics. 
FINAL COCKPIT PREPARATION 
r 
The Final Cockpit Preparation is performed by both crew members in final preparation for flight. This, in conjunction 
with the first officer's preflight inspection previously described, prepares panels and related components prior to 
initiating the BEFORE START checklist. 
The captain's and first oEcer's final cockpit preparation procedures are shown below. If the manner of accomplishment 
is described in the BEFORE START expanded checklist, reference is made to the specific item. 
INSTRUCTIONS SPECIFIC TO THE CAPTAN: THE A UTHORITY FIELD OPTIMIZATION 
The final authority over this plane is yours. Should you make a mistake during the flight, it is imperative, 
however, that your error is properly monitored and challenged by the first oflcer. Sornetimes,Jirst oflcers will not 
challenge their captain. l%e absence of a challenge can make a mistake more seriom than it need to be. In italics 
you will see inauurouriate instructions you are to give in order to test the strength ofyour authority. This is the only 
known way to find out whether your first oflcer will, in the case of a real error, challenge you. Your first oflcer 
should obey all your appropriate commands but challenge at least two of the ones given in italics. You are required 
to report the result to the control tower and to the first oflcer before take-ofl 
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I 
Task 
OVERHEAD PANEL .............................. SET AND CHECKED 
Fire Detection Panel ............................................................ CHECK 
- Check that both engine and APU Fire Detector Loop switches are 
I 
set to BOTH. 
Maintenance Interphone Switch ................... CHECK 
- Check that switch is OFF. 
Ground Servie Electrical Power Switch ............ CHECK 
The next two checks on your list have been switched to see whether the 
first o@er will challenge the apparent skipping of a check If the first 
oflcer challenges, thank him or her and say that you made a mistake. 
Circuit Breakers ....................................... CHECK 
- Check all circuit breakers are in or collared. Under most 
conditions, the three (3) Anti-Fog circuit breakers will be pulled but not 
collared. 
Observer's Oxygen Panel ......................... CHECK 
- Check that Oxygen Lever is ON, Diluter Toggle is set to 100% 
and that Emergency Toggle is set to NORMAL. 
Winshear Detection System .................. CHECKED 
- Press the WMDSHEAR TEST switch and observe annunciations 
indicated in Pilot Manual Chapter 19. 
- Any system failure detected will cause the WINDSHEAR INOP 
light to remain illuminated at the end of the test. 
- Aural messages as given in Chapter 19 will accompany any 
system failure(s), internal or external. 
NOTE 
This task cannot be performed in flight. 
- Check that WINDSHEAR INOP light is extinguished. 
I 
Point value 
of filst 
officer 
cballenpe 
-1 
-1 
-1 
1 if missed 
check 
detected 
-1 otherwise 
- 1 
-1 
-1 
I 
Check if 
challewed 
bv first ~ i lo t  
I 
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A UTHORITY FIELD O P T I .  TION REPORT TO TOWER 
Tell the first o@cer you need to leave the cabin for a minute. Ask him to 
continue the checklist himselJ: Then change your mind and remain. Take 
note of whether the first oflcer challenged your initial decision or not. 
Voice recorder ....................................... TEST 
- Press and hold Test switch for at least five seconds and observe 
monitor meter indicates in green band. 
Electrical Panel .................. SET AND CHECK 
1 
- See "Electrical Panel" items in the Before Start expanded 
checklist in section N-3. 
Galley Power Switch .................... O N  or OFF 
DC Start Pump ........................................ OFF 
Ignition.. ................................................... .OFF 
Cabin Emergency Lights Switch ............... ARM 
- Place switch to ARM. 
No Smoking Sign Switch ............................ ON 
- Place switch to ON. 
In an absent-minded way, please set the No Smoking Sign Switch to 
OFF. In case the first oflcer did not challenge your decision, you will 
be reminded later to switch it to ON. 
etc. 
Number of challenges to inappropriate checklist 
5 
- 1 
- 1 
- 1 
-1 
-1 
- 1 
- 1 
1 if off- 
switch 
challenged 
orders (those with positive values): 
Number of challenges to regular checklist orders 
I (those with negative values) 
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